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The Golden Bull was issued by Andrew II in the spring of 1222.1 It is the first 
of five charters of liberty published by the kings of Hungary in the thirteenth 
century and is the most celebrated.2 It has since the eighteenth century often 
been compared to Magna Carta, as showing a constitutional kinship between 
Hungary and England.3 Despite its subsequent reputation, however, the Golden 
Bull is not mentioned in any of the Hungarian chronicles of the Middle Ages; 
nor does it feature in foreign accounts and correspondence. Although the 
charters subsequently granted in 1231, 1267, 1290 and 1298 built on its provi-
sions and even borrowed from its text, they made no explicit reference to it. 
Moreover, despite the Golden Bull’s alleged circulation in seven copies, none of 
the originals has been found, even though one of these should according to the 
terms of its issue have been sent to the pope. Unlike the charter of 1231, which 
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the Age of Magna Carta”, held at UCL in October 2013.
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1 It was probably issued in early April. See Attila Zsoldos, “II. András Aranybullája”, Történelmi 
Szemle 53 (2011): 1–38 (4–5). The definitive Latin text of the Golden Bull was published with an 
introduction by Géza Érszegi, “Az aranybulla”, Fejér Megyei Történeti Évkönyv 6 (1972): 5–26. This 
is reproduced in Lajos Besenyei, Géza Érszegi, Maurizio Pedrazza Gorlero, eds, De Bulla Aurea 
Andreae II Regis Hungariae MCCXXII (Verona, 1999), 23–9, and in János M. Bak et al, eds and 
trans., Decreta Regni Mediaevalis Hungariae-The Laws of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary, vol. 
I – V (Bakersfield, CA, Idyllwild, CA, Los Angeles, CA, Salt Lake City, UT, Budapest 1989 – 2012, 
hereafter DRMH), vol. I (2nd ed.), 32–35. We retain in our account the conventional numbering 
of the articles, although these are in fact eighteenth-century innovations. 
2 The texts of these charters are given in DRMH, I2, 32–51. 
3 Discussed by Martyn Rady, “England and Hungarian Jurisprudence: Questions of Public and 
Private Law”, in László Péter, Rady, eds, British–Hungarian Relations since 1848 (London, 2004), 
315–27 (315–319).
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was copied several times into the papal registers, no evidence survives in Rome 
either of the Golden Bull or of its text.4 
Until the nineteenth century, the oldest extant version of the Golden Bull was 
thought to be the transcript contained in Louis I’s great privilege of 1351.5 Since, 
however, the content of Hungary’s medieval laws and the provenance of its parts 
were for a long time contested, some commentators proposed that the Golden 
Bull was actually the invention of humanist historians.6 In the 1820s, however, a 
copy of the Golden Bull sealed in 1318 by four of the kingdom’s leading prelates 
came to light, although it took some time to work out what it was.7 Subsequent 
publication of the correspondence of Honorius III spoke further to its authen-
ticity. Although not mentioning the Golden Bull by name, the pope’s letter to 
the bishop of Eger, composed in December 1222, related a report that the king 
had been stormed by a crowd and been presented with unwelcome demands, 
including the replacement of his government.8 No one would now regard the 
texts of 1318 and 1351 (they hardly differ) as anything other than genuine reiter-
ations of the original text of a charter given in 1222. Necessarily, however, the 
version that is on display in the Esztergom cathedral museum, beside which 
the judges of Hungary’s Constitutional Court now take their oaths of office, is 
not the original, but the copy made in 1318. To the disappointment of visiting 
schoolchildren, it is sealed not with gold, but with lumps of wax. 
The Golden Bull is one of a number of charters published in thirteenth-
century Christendom that sought to constrain the royal power. It may thus 
be compared to the Magna Carta of 1215, the imperial Statutum in favorem 
principum of 1232, the French Statute of Pamiers of 1212, the miscellaneous 
collection known as the Assizes of Jerusalem, the Aragonese fueros, and so 
on. We can cite much in the way of contacts between Hungary and all of these 
places. Andrew II’s sister-in-law was, for instance, Constance of Aragon and 
we know that some of her retinue subsequently settled in Hungary.9 Links with 
4 DRMH, I2, 102. 
5 Ibid., II, 8–13. 
6 Nándor Knauz, “Aranybulla”, Magyar Történelmi Tár 10 (1861): 203–18 (205); Andor Csizmadia, 
Adam Franz Kollar und die ungarische rechtshistorische Forschung (Vienna, 1982), 22. See also, 
Andor Csizmadia, “Previous Editions of the Laws of Hungary”, in DRMH I2, xvii–xxxiii (xxix).
7 Knauz, “Aranybulla”, 207. 
8 Augustin Theiner, Vetera Monumenta Historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia, vol. I (Rome, 
1859), 35–36.
9 Simon of Kéza, The Deeds of the Hungarians, eds and trans. László Veszprémy, Frank Schaer 
(Budapest and New York, 1999), 168–73 (ch. 91). See also, Hans Wagner, ed., Urkundenbuch 
des Burgenlandes, vol. I, (Graz, Cologne, 1955, hereafter Urkundenbuch des Burgenlandes), no. 
155; Imre Szentpétery, Ivan Borsa, eds, Regesta regum stirpis Arpadianae critico-diplomatica. 
Az Árpád-házi királyok okleveleinek kritikai jegyzéke, vol. I – II, (Budapest, 1923–1987, hereafter 
RA), vol. I, no 393. 
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England were also strong. Several of the English lords who extracted the Magna 
Carta from King John fought a few years later in the Fifth Crusade beside a 
Hungarian force led by same Bishop Thomas of Eger to whom Pope Honorius 
would write in December 1222.10 A Hungarian archbishop, almost certainly 
John of Esztergom, was along with at least one other Hungarian prelate present 
in Canterbury in 1220 for the translation of St Thomas, and the Becket cult was 
popular in Hungary.11 Notwithstanding these and other connections, we cannot 
demonstrate a textual link between the Golden Bull and any of its European 
counterparts. The same applies to the international legacy of the Golden Bull. 
In the 1355 Treaty of Buda and the Košice privilege of 1374, Louis I promised 
rights that were broadly analogous to those contained in the Golden Bull to the 
Polish nobility, whose support he needed to make good the Angevin dynastic 
claim to the Polish throne. The Golden Bull was subsequently inscribed in the 
Polish Land Rolls (Matriculae Regni Poloniae). There is no evidence, however, of 
any textual connection between the Golden Bull and such monuments of Polish 
liberty as Neminem captivabimus, De non praestanda obedientia, and Nihil novi.12
In view of the difficulties involved in establishing textual links, historians 
have generally shied away from positing a direct relationship between the 
Golden Bull and other charters of liberty, proposing instead that the Golden 
Bull arose out of broadly analogous assumptions and of conditions that were 
implicit within the developing feudal order.13 J. C. Holt has thus written of 
10 Sándor Fest, Magna Carta – Aranybulla (Szellemi érintkezések angolok es magyarok között 
III. Béla es II. Endre korában (Budapest, 1934), 4–14. Lists of Hungarian and Anglo-Norman 
participants in the Fifth Crusade are given in Attila Bárány, József Laszlovszky, Zsuzsanna Papp, 
eds, Angol-magyar kapcsolatok a középkorban, 2 vols (Máriabesnyő, 2008–2011), vol. I, 213–215. 
11 William Stubbs, ed., Memoriale fratris Walteri de Coventria, vol. II (London, 1873), 245; 
György Györffy, “Thomas Becket and Hungary”, Angol Filológiai Tanulmányok 4 (1969): 45–55 
(49–51); Anne Duggan, Thomas Becket (London, 2004), 235–236; Anne Duggan, “The Cult 
of St Thomas Becket in the Thirteenth Century”, in Meryl Jancey, ed., St Thomas Cantilupe, 
Bishop of Hereford (Hereford, 1982), 21–44 (27–28); Kay Brainerd Slocum, Liturgies in Honour of 
Thomas Becket (Toronto, 2004), 115–6, 151. Hungary had two archbishoprics, at Esztergom and 
Kalocsa. The visitor to Canterbury is less likely to have been Archbishop Ugrin Csák of Kalocsa. 
He had only recently been appointed to office (1219) and his sphere of responsibility looked 
southwards, towards the Balkans. The Becket cult was also especially strong in Esztergom. 
See László Solymosi, “Magyar főpapok angliai zarándoklata 1220-ben”, Történelmi Szemle 55 
(2013): 527–40 (527, 536), who additionally demonstrates the presence in Canterbury of Bishop 
Desiderius of Cenad (Csanád) and, possibly also, of Bishop Alexander of Oradea (Várad). 
12 Adorján Divéky, Az arany bulla hatása a lengyel jogra (Budapest, 1942), 5–14; Dániel Bagi, 
“Nagy Lajos lengyelországi uralmának megitelése a lengyel történetirásban”, in Péter Hanák, 
Mariann Nagy, eds, Hid a századok felett. Tanulmányok Katus Lajos 70. születésnapjára (Pécs, 
1997), 45–59 (47–55).
13 Gejza Ferdinándy, Az arany bulla. Közjogi tanulmány (Budapest, 1899), 52; Henrik Marczali, 
Magyarország története az Árpádok korában. A rendi alkotmány kezdetei (Budapest, 1896), 77–8. 
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the flowering of charters of liberty in Europe during the High Middle Ages, 
including in Hungary: ‘These liberties were cognate. There is no need to explain 
the many similarities between them as derivatives from some basic grant or 
legal code […] The liberties of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were no 
infection spreading from one country to another; they were part of the very 
atmosphere.’14 Or, as another historian has put it, with specific reference to the 
Golden Bull and Magna Carta, ‘As both charters were the products of societies 
with institutions based on customary systems of privileges and mutual fidelity, 
it is not surprising that there should be some similarities.’15 
The difficulties with this approach are twofold. First, it supposes common 
circumstances, which is by no means obvious. Although never a ‘crypto-
Sultanate and nomadic despotism decked out in Christian clothing,’ Hungary 
was far from being a developed feudal monarchy with a strong governmental 
apparatus, a burgeoning administration and an advanced understanding of 
communal rights.16 Legal literacy was, moreover, a relatively recent phenomenon. 
It is partly for this reason that the written remains of this period are so slender 
– for the reign of Andrew II, seldom more than a dozen or so royal charters 
survive for any one year.17 Secondly, having proposed the existence of broadly 
analogous institutions, historians are apt to read across from one charter to the 
other, introducing elements that were never there or that only came into play 
much later. This particularly affects the way in which historians have interpreted 
Hungary’s Golden Bull and the so-called resistance clause, commonly given as 
Article 31, which is contained in the eschatocol.
In what follows, we will first examine the composition of the Golden Bull 
and the discrepancies in its text, particularly as they relate to the regnal year 
The older literature is reviewed in Bálint Hóman, Gyula Szekfű, Magyar történet, 3rd edition, 
vol. I (Budapest, 1935), 655. See also, József Gerics, “Von den Universi servientes Regis bis 
zu der Universitas Nobilium Regni Hungariae”, Album Elemér Mályusz. Studies presented to 
the International Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions 
(Brussels, 1976), 97–108 (99).
14 J. C. Holt, Magna Carta, 2nd edition (Cambridge, 1992), 80–81. 
15 László Péter, “Ius resistendi in Hungary”, in Péter and Rady, Resistance, Rebellion and 
Revolution in Hungary and Central Europe: Commemorating 1956 (London, 2008), 41–55 (43). 
See also, Elemér Hantos, The Magna Carta of The English and of The Hungarian Constitution: A 
comparative view of the law and institutions of the early middle ages (London, 1904), 149. 
16 As argued by Pál Engel, The Realm of St Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895–1526 
(London, New York, 2001), 95; also, Gyula Kristó, Histoire de la Hongrie médiévale. Le Temps 
des Árpáds (Rennes, 2000), 132. The quotation is from Josef Deér, “Der Weg zur Goldenen 
Bulle Andreas’ II. von 1222”, Schweizerische Beiträge zur Allgemeinen Geschichte 10 (1952): 
104–138 (111). 
17 The royal charters issued during the Árpád period are calendared in RA. Those given during 
Andrew II’s reign, including forgeries later issued in his name, are itemized in RA, I, nos 217–566. 
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and the dignitary list given in the eschatocol. We will build here on the work of 
János Karácsonyi and on the important revision to his conclusions, published 
recently by Attila Zsoldos.18 Unlike previous commentators, however, we will 
argue that the Golden Bull is actually a composite document. At its heart lies 
a petition which was then converted into a privilege by the royal chancellery. 
Besides adding the usual material found in the introduction or protocollum 
of royal charters, the chancellery also included a lengthy narratio and, at the 
end of the petition’s text, the eschatocol. The petition and the material added 
by the chancellery related, however, to two different constituencies. On the 
one side, there were the so-called servientes regis, who were the authors of the 
petition, and, on the other, a number of the kingdom’s great lords, with whom 
the material added by the chancellery is mainly concerned. Examination of the 
Golden Bull’s structure and composition serves to expose the separate political 
forces behind its publication and, as we will show, provides important clues to 
the way in which its content should be viewed. 
Composition
The Golden Bull is written in the manner of a privilege, in good chancellery 
Latin. Considerable difficulties, nevertheless, arise in respect of its composition, 
which was not straightforward. After the brief formalities of the protocollum 
and the usual royal style, a lengthy narratio follows, which recalls the reduction 
of the liberties of the kingdom’s nobles that had been given them in the eleventh 
century by St Stephen.19 For this, King Andrew blamed his predecessors and the 
counsel of wicked and self-seeking men, but noted that rancour also attached 
to his own relations with the nobles. Accordingly, he had consented to their 
entreaties and granted to them ‘the liberty given by the holy king’ and ‘all else 
that pertains to the reformation of the state of our kingdom.’ This first part of 
the Golden Bull is addressed, therefore, to the kingdom’s noblemen, a term that 
was more literary than legal, but which was generally applied at this time to 
the kingdom’s elite of large landowners.20 Preeminent within this group were 
the king’s principal office holders, who are referred to in the Golden Bull by an 
originally Turkic title, iobagiones, which we translate as ‘retainers.’21 
18 János Karácsonyi, Az aranybulla keletkezése és első sorsa (Budapest, 1899); Zsoldos, “II. András 
Aranybullája”.
19 On the narrationes of Hungarian royal charters, see more generally Gyula Kristó, Középkori 
históriák oklevelekben (Szeged, 1992), 14–29. 
20 Zsolt Hunyadi, “Maiores, Optimates, Nobiles: Semantic Questions in the Early History of the 
Hungarian Nobility”, Annual of Medieval Studies at CEU, 1996–1997 (1998), 204–211 (206–208). 
21 The word conceals the title of beg or chieftain, rendered as bäg or bäg-lär on the Orkhon 
inscription. See Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. I (London, Leiden, 1960), 1159. The first reference to a 
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What follows, however, is a series of articles that mainly address not the 
nobles of the kingdom but another group, called the servientes regis.22 This part 
of the privilege, the dispositio, includes a range of provisions touching upon 
their affairs – that the servientes might gather at the royal assembly held every 
year at Székesfehérvár on St Stephen’s feast day; that they were jurisdictionally 
subject to the ruler; that they were exempted from certain taxes; had defined 
military obligations; might leave their property to whomever they wished; were 
not obliged to give hospitality to royal officers or pasturage to the royal pigs; 
should not have their fields given over by churchmen to the king’s horses under 
the pretext of tithe, and so on.23 Even those articles that do not refer directly to 
the servientes might nonetheless be thought of sufficiently general application 
to be of benefit to them – that the coinage not be debased; that the salt trade be 
regulated; that outlaws not be shielded; that the tithe be paid in kind and so on. 
Only a very few articles deal specifically with the rights and duties of others – 
that no senior royal retainer or iobagio hold more than two offices; that warriors 
attached to royal castles be preserved in their freedoms; and that noblemen 
should not be executed without the king’s knowledge. 
The eschatocol follows. It establishes that seven copies be made, itemizing 
each recipient. Once more, however, the subject of the text changes, moving 
back from servientes to nobles. It is the nobles who together with the king are 
required to keep to the terms of the privilege, and are placed under the super-
vision of the palatine in this matter.24 It is the nobles also, who along with the 
bishops and the king’s main officers have the right to enforce the privilege: ‘We 
have also decreed that if we or any of our successors at any time should seek 
to oppose the terms of this settlement, both the bishops and other retainers 
(iobagiones) as well as the nobles of the realm, singularly and in common, shall 
by this authority have the right in perpetuity to resist and speak against us and 
high officer of the king holding the title of iobagio is from 1172 – László Erdélyi, ed., A Pannonhalmi 
Szent-Benedek-Rend története, 12 vols (Budapest, 1902–1916), vol. I, 604. See also Attila Zsoldos, A 
szent király szabadjai. Fejezetek a várjobbágyság történetéből (Budapest, 1999), 25.
22 Some historians have argued that the nobiles and servientes mentioned in the Golden Bull 
were in fact identical, most recently János Varga, A királyi serviens (Budapest 2006), 26–30. 
Varga relies on the same arguments and the same clutch of forgeries and interpolated texts as 
were discredited a century ago by László Erdélyi, “Anonymus korának társadalmi viszonyai”, 
Történeti Szemle 3 (1914): 190–211 (195–202); Erdélyi, “Árpádkori társadalomtörténetünk 
legkritikusabb kérdései”, Történeti Szemle 3 (1914): 517–61 (522–523), and Történeti Szemle 5 
(1916): 39–63 (39–47). 
23 Article 21 on bishops, horses and the tithe is straightforward, but has been made 
unconvincingly complicated by László Juhász, “Az Aranybulla 21. cikke megromlott szövegének 
helyreállitása”, Filológiai Közlöny 4, no. 1 (1958): 99–103 (101). 
24 The advisory role accorded to the palatine is unusual, but it is hard to see that he is here being 
promoted to the role of an Aragonese justizza. 
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our successors without the stain of faithlessness.’ The eschatocol concludes with 
the name of the chancellor who had drawn up the instrument, a list of current 
dignitaries and year of issue. The dignitary list, however, gives no secular 
officers, but only the names of ten prelates.25 The king’s regnal year is odd.26 
We will return to these points, but first we need to conclude our account of the 
Golden Bull’s formal composition and structure. 
What we have is a charter made up of several parts. The main body of the 
text, the dispositio, has all the characteristics of a petition. Indeed, this was the 
usual way that legislation was made both in the thirteenth century and later. It 
would also comport with the account given in the correspondence of Honorius 
III of the storming of the king by a crowd, who sought to extract concessions 
from him.27 In its original form, we may guess that the petition referred to the 
king in the third person. In publishing it with the royal seal, the chancellery 
converted rex to the royal Nos, but failed to spot every occasion on which it 
should do so (articles 4, 7, 29). We may suppose that the petition was the work 
of the servientes regis, who constituted its main beneficiaries. Possibly, the text 
was augmented by other parties prior to publication. It was certainly dressed 
up by someone versed in the language of canon law.28 We cannot exclude that 
Andrew II adjusted some of its terms, although the text was surely so poten-
tially damaging to the royal financial administration that we must rule out the 
idea that it was ‘his bull.’29 The petition, having been received and emended, was 
then topped and tailed by the chancellery. A narratio was added, which referred 
not to the servientes but to the nobles of the kingdom. Possibly it was culled 
from another charter. The chancellery regularly borrowed passages in this way, 
without much discrimination, and the themes of bad counsel and ill will are a 
feature of other charters published during Andrew’s reign.30 The chancellery 
also added an eschatocol, including here the so-called resistance clause. As 
it stands, the resistance clause is weak, falling far short of the Magna Carta’s 
25 After 1192, the chancellery used dignitary lists in place of witness lists. See Árpád Nógrády, 
“Magistratus et Comitatus Tenentibus.” II. András kormányzati rendszerének kérdéséhez”, 
Századok 129 (1995): 157–94 (157). 
26 On the dignitary list and regnal year in Hungarian charters more generally, see László 
Solymosi, Irásbeliség és társadalom az Árpád-korban (Budapest, 2006), 21. 
27 Theiner, Vetera Monumenta, I, 36.
28 József Gerics, “Az aranybulla ellenállás záradékának értelmezéséhez”, in Iván Bertényi, ed., 
Ünnepi Tanulmányok. Sinkovics István (Budapest, 1980), 99–108 (100–101). 
29 Cf. Zsoldos, “András II. Aranybullája”, 37. 
30 Richard Marsina, “Die Arengen in ungarischen Urkunden bis zum J. 1235”, Folia Diplomatica, 
1 (1971): 215–225; Georgius Fejér, ed., Codex diplomaticus Hungariae ecclesiasticus ac civilis, vol. 
III/1 (Buda, 1829, hereafter CD), 121, 255–7; Gusztáv Wenzel, ed., Árpádkori új okmánytár, vol. 
VI, (Pest, 1867, hereafter AUO], 400 (RA, I, nos 272, 317, 354).
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threat ‘to distrain and distress us in every way [...], namely by seizing castles, 
lands and possessions.’ Nor does it establish an enforcement mechanism in the 
manner of Magna Carta’s twenty-five barons. One possible explanation is that 
the chancellery put in the resistance clause to avoid including something else, 
which was in fact frequently appended to royal charters. This was an anathema 
or excommunication clause, threatening any violation of the terms of a privilege 
with the most extreme sanction available to the church. Indeed, it was this more 
fearsome instrument that was appended in place of the resistance clause to the 
Golden Bull’s immediate successor, the privilege published by Andrew II in 
1231.31 It was also appended in the same year as the Golden Bull in Andrew’s 
charter laying down the relationship of the clergy to secular courts.32 
The Hungarian chancellery was a sloppy office that even managed on 
occasions to mistake the number of the reigning monarch.33 It is unlikely, 
however, that the omission of secular office-holders from the dignitary list 
and the muddling of the regnal year in the eschatocol are careless errors. Just 
a few sentences before, when listing who should be given a copy of the Golden 
Bull, the king’s first officer, the palatine, is mentioned, but with the description 
qui pro tempore fuerit, ‘the future incumbent.’ The conclusion is pretty much 
inescapable – there was no government at the time that the Golden Bull was 
issued. If we look through the dignitary lists given in the handful of charters 
published during 1222, we will moreover notice that there were over the course 
of the year no less than three governments, each headed by a separate palatine, 
and with a different list of royal officers.34 Something was going on that suggests 
that the affairs of the realm were not in order. In respect of the regnal year, we 
may obtain a hint at what was causing the commotion. It is here that the story 
of Andrew II begins to intersect with that of England’s King John. In place of 
little Arthur, duke of Brittany, we have in Hungary the case of little Ladislas, 
who had an equally villainous uncle in the person of Andrew, and in place of 
King Richard the Lion Heart, we have Ladislas’s father, King Imre or Emeric, 
who was Andrew II’s elder brother.35 
31 DRMH, I2, p. 39. 
32 Richard Marsina, ed., Codex Diplomaticus et Epistolaris Slovaciae 805–1235 (Bratislava, 1971, 
hereafter CDES), 199. 
33 Urkundenbuch des Burgenlandes, nos 197–198 (1233).
34 Karácsonyi proposed the existence of four separate governments in the course of 1222. See 
Karácsonyi, Az aranybulla keletkezése, 20–22. Zsoldos convincingly demonstrates that there 
were only three, “II. András Aranybullája”, 31–33, headed respectively by Nicholas, son of Barc; 
Theodor, son of Wetich; and Gyula of the Kán kindred. See also Attila Zsoldos, Magyarország 
világi archontológiája 1000–1301 (Budapest, 2011), 18. 
35 Arthur of Brittany (1187–1203) was the son of John’s elder brother, Geoffrey of Brittany. He 
was reputed to have been murdered by John. 
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Andrew II and the ‘New Arrangements’
Despite the reputation he obtained by actually visiting the Holy Land 
and so fulfilling an oath previously laid upon his father, Andrew II was not 
a good man. Following the death of his father, Béla III, in 1196, Andrew had 
waged almost continuous war upon his elder brother, carving out for himself a 
dukedom in the south of the kingdom in which he maintained an independent 
power, even minting his own coinage. Upon his brother’s death in 1204, Andrew 
seized power, disregarding the rights of inheritance that attached to Imre’s 
infant son, Ladislas III, even though the child had been previously crowned 
at his father’s behest in order to ensure his succession. Ignoring several papal 
pleas that he behave properly towards his nephew, Andrew chased Ladislas 
and his mother, Constance of Aragon, out of the kingdom, seizing their private 
assets. Nevertheless, it was only after Ladislas’s premature death in 1205 that 
Andrew was formally crowned in the coronation city of Székesfehérvár, from 
the occasion of which he henceforth counted his regnal year.36 
The decade that followed saw repeated conflict between Andrew and the 
kingdom’s churchmen, the plundering of Hungary by the relatives of Andrew’s 
Bavarian queen, Gertrude of Andechs-Merania, the gradual ousting from influ-
ence of the men who had previously served Imre, and the breakdown of trust 
between Andrew and many of his leading subjects. For reasons that remain 
uncertain, the palatine was murdered in 1209 and the queen herself assassinated 
in 1213. It speaks of the poverty of the king’s reputation that the killing of Queen 
Gertrude was sanctioned by the archbishop of Esztergom, who reputedly deliv-
ered the famously ambiguous words to the conspirators, ‘Do you shrink from kill-
ing the Queen? It is right to do so. If others agree, I will not stand in the way.’37 As 
it turned out, the king’s vengeance was restrained and many of those implicated 
in the murder remained in office. Andrew remarried, into the line of the Latin 
emperors of Constantinople, and now began to imagine a new career for himself.38 
36 György Székely, Antal Bartha, Magyarország története. Előzmények és magyar történet 1242-ig, 
vol. II (Budapest, 1984, hereafter Magyarország története), 1258–1272.
37 Reginam interficere nolite timere bonum est, et si omnes consenserint, ego solus non contradico: 
Chronica Albrici Monachi Trium Fontium in Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores, 
vol XXIII, 898. As Matthew Paris pointed out, the meaning of the first clause depends upon 
whether bonum governs timere or interficere. See Paris, Chronica Majora, ed. H. R. Luard, vol. 
III (London, 1876), 51; also Paris, Historia Anglorum, ed. Sir Frederic Madden, vol. II (London, 
1866), 234. For the background, circumstances and subsequent depiction of Gertrude’s murder, 
see now Judit Majorossy, “A királynét megölni nem kell félnetek jó lesz […]” Merániai Gertrúd 
emlékezete, 1213–2013 (Szentendre, 2013). 
38 On Andrew II’s relations with the emperor of Constantinople, Robert de Courtenay, see now 
Attila Bárány, “Courtenay Róbert latin császár Magyarországon”, in Attila Györkös, Gergely Kiss, 
eds, Francia-magyar kapcsolatok a középkorban (Debrecen, 2013), 153–181. 
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He had always pursued an active foreign policy, intervening in Galicia – Volhynia 
(in present-day Ukraine) and in the northern Balkans, but now the prospect of an 
eastern crown beckoned.39 With this vain hope in his mind, Andrew prepared to 
join the Fifth Crusade. His stay in the Holy Land was short and fruitless, lasting 
just a few months over the winter of 1217–18. Andrew used the opportunity to 
amass trophies and organize the marriages of his children. While he was abroad, 
there was an attempted putsch in Hungary that was put down by Andrew’s regent, 
Archbishop John of Esztergom – the same churchman who had previously stood 
aside from Gertrude’s murder and would a few years later be probably a visitor 
to Canterbury.40 
Following his return to Hungary from the Holy Land in 1218, there was a 
sudden alteration in the way the chancellery dated Andrew’s reign. Instead of 
commencing the years of his rule in 1205, when Andrew had been crowned, royal 
letters now began to add an additional year, implying that the king had begun 
ruling in the spring of 1204.41 By this adjustment, Andrew effectively wrote out 
of the historical record both the reign of little Ladislas and the last months of 
his brother’s rule. There can only be one plausible explanation for this – that 
Andrew was voiding the charters published by Imre or given in Ladislas’s name 
in the eighteen months or so before his own accession. This conjecture would 
fit with the knowledge we have of Andrew overlooking donations made by his 
brother, either seizing lands for himself or allocating them to new owners.42 It 
draws attention, moreover, to the most notorious aspect of Andrew’s reign – his 
policy towards property and what Andrew called the ‘new arrangements’ (nove 
institutiones) or ‘general distribution’ (generalis distributio), whereby he handed 
out huge tracts of royal estate to his followers.43 
All Hungarian rulers gave away land. Mostly, however, their gifts were 
modest and usually confined to territory on the frontier. The alienation of 
property by Andrew was quite different in scale, involving large swathes of 
countryside that had hitherto provided the backbone of the kingdom’s organi-
zation of earthen castles, garrison troops and royal serving peoples and provi-
sioners.44 The main beneficiaries were, in the first instance, the relatives of 
Queen Gertrude and, subsequently, the clique of office holders who gathered 
in the royal court. In order to bolster the support available to him, Andrew 
39 Theiner, Vetera Monumenta, I, 4–5.
40 AUO, VI, 399. Discussed in, Zsoldos, “II. András Aranybullája”, 22–23. 
41 The regnal year used in royal charters during Andrew II’s reign is exhaustively reviewed by 
Karácsonyi, Az Aranybulla keletkezése, 5–20. 
42 CD, III/1, 255–7; RA, I, nos 269, 272; Urkundenbuch des Burgenlandes, no. 116. 
43 RA, I, no 320; CD, III/1, 255. 
44 Magyarország története, 1277–80.
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augmented the number of court dignitaries, adding new titles. Royal offices 
were tied to conglomerations of counties, the revenues of which were intended 
to support the holder in the performance of his duties. The extent to which the 
royal domain was being apparently squandered by Andrew not only alarmed 
his son and heir, Béla, who even at a tender age realized that his patrimony 
was being diminished, but also prompted several letters of admonition from 
Honorius III that talked of Andrew violating the promise he had given at his 
coronation not to reduce the ‘rights of the kingdom.’ It was possibly Honorius’s 
intervention in either or both of 1220 and 1225 that resulted in the Hungarian 
coronation oath subsequently including a ‘non-alienability’ clause.45 
It is common enough to disparage Andrew II for wastefulness. He was, 
however, no fool. In other aspects of his fiscal policy, he showed acumen, 
centralizing the salt trade to boost his revenues, granting upon payment exemp-
tions from the burden of exchanging old coin for new, and imposing permanent 
taxes, including a customs levy on the border.46 In explaining Andrew’s gifts 
of royal estate, historians have inclined to believe his own words – that the 
measure of kingship was the limitlessness of the ruler’s generosity, and other 
such tropes.47 Such is, however, to confuse virtue with expediency. What lay 
behind the wholesale alienation of royal estate were military need and the urgent 
requirement to update the kingdom’s army. Upon Andrew’s accession, the forces 
available to the ruler were not much different from what they had been several 
centuries before – a core of mainly foreign horsemen, who attended the king 
in the manner of a druzhina or Gefolgschaft; Asiatic light cavalry who had been 
settled in the kingdom, mainly to see off raiders from the east; and warriors 
attached to the kingdom’s earthen castles who mustered under local captains.48 
The warriors, who subsisted off small plots, were not numerous and so at time 
of war the manpower of the castles had to be supplemented by the local popula-
tion.49 This was emphatically not an army of mounted knights, capable of shock 
45 Emma Bartoniek, “A koronázási eskü fejlődése 1526-ig”, Századok 51 (1917): 5–44 (7–9); James 
Ross Sweeney, “The Decretal Intellecto and the Hungarian Golden Bull of 1222”, Album Elemér 
Mályusz. Studies presented to the International Commission for the History of Representative and 
Parliamentary Institutions (Brussels, 1976), 89–96. See also, János M. Bak, Königtum und Stände 
in Ungarn im 14.–16. Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden, 1973), 19.
46  László Blazovich, “The Origins of the Golden Bull”, in De Bulla Aurea, 181–190 (186); András 
Kubinyi, “Königliches Salzmonopol und die Städte des Königreichs Ungarn im Mittelalter”, in 
Wilhelm Rausch, ed., Stadt und Salz (Linz, 1988), 213–232 (213–217); Magyarország története, 
1278–1280. 
47 Marsina, “Die Arengen in ungarischen Urkunden”, 218–23.
48 Martyn Rady, “The Slavs, Avars and Magyars”, in Anne Curry, ed., The Cambridge History of 
Warfare, vol. II, forthcoming. 
49 Gyula Kristó, Az Árpád-kor háborúi (Budapest, 1986), 198–200. 
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assaults and bound by a chivalric ethos. It was mostly only good for defensive 
work and harrying, or for forays into the Balkans and onto the western steppe. 
For this reason, campaigning abroad was frequently preceded by the urgent 
recruitment of foreign warriors and mercenaries.50 
The land that Andrew dispensed to his followers was seldom given on 
explicit conditions. Nevertheless, a powerful understanding informed the 
donations that he made. The land that the king gave was bestowed freely as 
a gift, in perpetuity, and as a remuneratio for faithful service. It was given in 
the expectation that it would inspire others, as well as the recipient himself, 
to further acts of valorous endeavour on the royal behalf. The relationship 
between king and subject was not meanly contractual, but comprehended in 
terms of affection, which implied a limitless duty on the side of both parties.51 
In this respect, it was typical of the obligations attending lordship elsewhere in 
Europe, which spoke of commitments being comprehended propter amorem or 
pro drudo.52 Even grants of land, conveyed exclusively for military purpose, such 
as the cession of the Transylvanian Ţara Bârsei (Burzenland) to the Teutonic 
Knights in 1211, laid no specific obligations on the recipients other than the 
hope that the kingdom be extended by their efforts.53 
Other charters conveying grants of land, or confirming their possessors in 
them, adopted an even more expressive vocabulary. This was particularly the 
case when the beneficiary stood outside the ranks of the king’s leading men 
and was receiving a gift for the first time. On account of his courage, therefore, 
a warrior of Pressburg (Bratislava), Zerzowoy, was given by King Imre in 1197 
the land he held of the castle, removed from its jurisdiction, and admitted to 
the membership and libertas of the royal court.54 A few years later, a certain 
Johannes Latinus of Transylvania was granted exemptions on his property and 
similarly made a member of the court. The charter explained that Johannes 
and his heirs might forever have the right to keep company there, in return for 
which they were expected to serve the king at time of war.55 Other charters of 
50 Elemér Mályusz, “A magyar köznemesség kialakulása”, Századok 76 (1942): 272–305, 407–434 
(290). 
51 Péter Váczy, “A királyi serviensek és a patrimoniális királyság” Századok 51–22 (1927–1928): 
243–90, 351–414 (276–277); Martyn Rady, Nobility, Land and Service in Medieval Hungary 
(Basingstoke, New York, 2000), 36–7. 
52 Magnus Ryan, “Succession to Fiefs: A Ius Commune feudorum?” in John W. Cairns and Paul 
J. du Plessis, eds, The Creation of the Ius Commune: From Casus to Regula (Edinburgh, 2010), 
143–158 (149); Frederic L. Cheyette, Ermengard of Narbonne and the World of the Troubadours 
(New York, 2001), 233–234. 
53 Franz Zimmermann, Carl Werner, eds, Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in 
Siebenbürgen, vol. I (Hermanstadt, 1892, hereafter Ub.), 11. 
54 CDES, 96–97. 
55 AUO, I, 91–92 (1204).
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this type refer to the recipient enjoying access to the royal domus and familia.56 
By his faithfulness and the rewards he received in recompense, the beneficiary 
thus became a part of the king’s household, with the right to enter his hall and 
mingle there freely. In time of conflict, he was expected to come to the king’s 
aid, furnishing troops from the land he had been given as a reward for past 
service, and he might expect that his succour be in turn acknowledged with 
further demonstrations of royal largesse.57 Historians are fond of describing the 
retinues that the kingdom’s lords gathered in the thirteenth century from their 
estates as ‘private armies.’58 These contingents should more properly be seen as 
the manifestations of fidelity that those in the king’s household were bound at 
time of war to bring to their royal father. 
The alienation of royal estate was not, therefore, a sign of Andrew’s 
irresponsibility, but arose from the contemporary understanding of faithfulness 
and from the way that this affected military obligation. Even though the pace 
of alienation slowed under Andrew’s successor, his initiatives still resulted in 
the transformation of the Hungarian army. By the 1260s, roughly half the royal 
host was provided by the retinues of the kingdom’s great men and it consisted 
increasingly of heavy cavalry. Around this time, their description in the sources 
changed from loricati to pancerati, which suggests a transition from leather 
cladding to chain mail, although for many the cost of metal armour must 
surely have been prohibitive.59 The system of military recruitment promoted 
by Andrew II was, nevertheless, retained by Hungary’s Angevin rulers, who 
mainly relied in their wars on the banderia of mounted knights that rode to war 
under the standards of the kingdom’s great lords. Their retinues were clearly 
large, at times sucking in several thousand or more small landowners who 
began themselves to conceive of their bond to their lords as marked by the 
same interplay of affection, duty and reward as also governed their master’s 
relationship to the king.60 
As elsewhere in Europe, land and service were conjoined in Hungary 
through the notion of fidelity that bound lord and subject in a personal 
relationship of succour and reward. It is in this context that we should view 
the resistance clause included in the eschatocol of the Golden Bull. Although 
later understood in this way, the resistance clause was not an invitation to 
56 Váczy, “A királyi serviensek”, 261–264.
57 Ibid, 272. 
58 See thus Gyula Kristó, Az Árpád-kor háborúi, 205.
59 László Veszprémy, “Páncél és páncélosok emlitései a krónikákban és oklevelekben”, 
Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 108, no 4 (1995): 3–11 (9). 
60 Attila Zsoldos, “The First Centuries of Hungarian Military Organization”, in László Veszprémy, 
Béla K. Király, eds, Millennium of Hungarian Military History (Boulder, CO & Highland Lakes, 
NJ, 2002), 3–25 (20–21). 
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insurrection and to the setting aside by diffidatio of the fealty that was properly 
due to the king. In fact, it constituted the reverse of this. However much the 
nobles, either as individuals or as a group, might oppose the king should he 
act in contravention of the Golden Bull, the stain of faithlessness should not 
attach to them. In other words, they should not as a consequence of their 
actions be cut off from the rewards and largesse that flowed from the king to 
his faithful servants. The resistance clause is in this respect misnamed. It was 
a statement that the kingdom’s noblemen were still faithfully committed to the 
king even though they should act against him, not that they might withdraw 
their allegiance from him with impunity. It was a fidelity clause, or, since fidelity 
was so bound up with the concept of reward, a clause intended to guarantee 
their continued remuneration. 
The ‘Imre Faction’ and the Servientes
The royal reward was, nevertheless, discretionary. In the distribution of the 
royal largesse, not everyone was a winner. Some were overlooked; others were 
plundered, and their lands redistributed to others, whose fidelity was deemed 
more precious. Among the losers were the former supporters of King Imre. We 
may track the careers of several of their number and observe the way they either 
fell from the lists of royal officers in the years following Andrew’s accession, 
or else played only an intermittent part in government. None, it would seem, 
made it into the core of household officers that increasingly dominated the 
king’s inner counsels.61 Possibly it was members of this disaffected group that 
were behind the putsch that was mounted while Andrew was away on crusade. 
Possibly also, they rallied around Andrew’s son, Béla, promoting him as a rival 
focus of authority and allegiance, even to the extent of obtaining his coronation 
in 1214 as iunior rex. In this respect, the clause in the Golden Bull permitting 
transfer from the royal court to Béla’s is suggestive of the young king’s influ-
ence.62 The part played by Imre’s supporters in the events that led to the issue of 
the Golden Bull is, however, indicated by one detail in its text – the regnal year 
given in the final sentence of the charter. 
As we have already noted, from 1218 royal charters altered Andrew II’s regnal 
year, dating the start of his reign in 1204 rather than 1205. By this, Andrew was 
able to invalidate donations given in the eighteen months before his accession. 
The Golden Bull, however, returned to the older practice observed before 1218 
of dating Andrew’s reign from 1205, and it is unusual in this respect. There is 
only one other charter issued in the course of 1222 or, indeed, later that keeps 
61 Zsoldos, “II. András Aranybullája”, 18–20.
62 Ibid, 6–8.
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the same dating of the regnal year as the Golden Bull.63 We cannot establish 
with any certainty in which month this second charter was issued. Unlike the 
Golden Bull, it does, however, provide a list of secular office holders. As far as 
we can make out, almost all of these were former office holders under Imre or 
their close kinsmen, whose careers had been eclipsed in the subsequent period, 
including most obviously the new palatine, Theodor, son of Wetich.64 In short, 
the party that had gathered around Imre, and had been worsted by Andrew in 
the civil conflict within the royal house, were back and looking to recover their 
lands, by reactivating the charters that the change in the regnal year had voided. 
By re-dating Andrew’s rule to 1205, the Golden Bull served their interests, and 
in the wake of its issue they formed the king’s new government. 
In fact, the ‘Imre government’ lasted only a couple of months. It was replaced 
by the king – possibly at the St Stephen’s Day assembly or even before – and a 
regime made up of loyalists to Andrew was installed. The new government was 
headed by Gyula of the Kán kindred, who had previously served Andrew over 
several decades.65 Replacement of the ‘Imre government’ allowed the king to 
ignore the terms of the Golden Bull that had forced from him. Only a year later, 
in defiance of the Golden Bull, he gave away the county of Keve – in contra-
vention of the article in the Golden Bull prohibiting the alienation of whole 
counties – and, further ignoring its terms, he continued to employ Muslims 
and Jews in the kingdom’s financial administration, thereby earning the Pope’s 
renewed displeasure and his own eventual excommunication.66 After a few 
years, he resumed the debasement of the coinage.67 
The supporters of Imre were one group who had lost out in the distribution 
of the royal largesse that attended Andrew’s ‘new arrangements.’ A second 
group were the castle warriors and serving peoples, whose lands and liveli-
hoods were threatened by the alienation of the royal domain upon which they 
had hitherto subsisted. Although the property of the warriors was generally 
spared from donation, their way of life was jeopardised by the emphasis now 
placed on the establishment of knightly retinues.68 As the land belonging to the 
serving peoples who had economically sustained the castles was given away, the 
63 Ub.,I, 18 (RA, I, no 380). 
64 Their careers are reviewed in Karácsonyi, Az aranybulla keletkezése, 23–24; Zsoldos, 
“II. András Aranybullája”, 6.
65 Zsoldos, Magyarország világi archontológiája, 305–306.
66 Tibor Antal Horváth, Lajos Huszár, “Kamaragrófok a középkorban”, Numizmatikai Közlöny 
54–55 (1955 – 1956): 21–33 (22); more generally, Nora Berend, At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, 
Muslims and ‘Pagans’ in Medieval Hungary, c. 1000–c. 1300 (Cambridge, 2001), 120–129; György 
Györffy, Az Árpád-kori Magyarország történeti földrajza, vol. III (Budapest, 1987), 317–319. 
67 Bálint Hóman, Magyar pénztörténet 1000–1325 (Budapest, 1916), 304–307, 442.
68 Zsoldos, A szent király szabadjai, 78–80. 
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entire structure of the castle organization began to falter. It was manifested in 
the many surviving cases of serving people seeking to alter their status in order 
to protect their lands from encroachment.69 We also know of castle lands being 
invaded illegally by avaricious landowners, who took advantage of the larger 
redistribution of property to augment their own holdings.70 
Paradoxically, however, the castle warriors found a supporter in the king. 
Andrew II’s ‘new arrangements’ were predicated on the men to whom he had 
given land manifesting their renewed faithfulness to him by providing him 
with retinues at time of war. Invariably, the numbers that they mustered were 
less than the king might have hoped, not because of laziness or bad will, but 
because recruitment at this time was generally an uncertain business.71 During 
the second decade of the century, Andrew started to take warriors who had 
previously served in the kingdom’s castles under his protection. They were lifted 
out of the ‘servitude of the castle’ and made into royal servants, who henceforth 
performed their military duties under the royal standard (sub vexillo regio) 
rather than in the local units fielded by the castles. The name by which they 
were known – the first unequivocal reference is from 1212 – was servientes regis, 
and it is their petition that the Golden Bull communicates.72 
In the years immediately preceding the Golden Bull, the pace of preferment 
increased. Andrew was gathering to himself a royal retinue, almost his own 
‘private army’, on which he could rely for numbers. In so doing, Andrew effec-
tively wrecked much of what remained of the old castle system, for the lords 
who had previously the county contingents were now robbed of their military 
muscle. In the majority of cases, the servientes were confirmed in the lands that 
they already held as warriors, but a few received additional land grants of land, 
either by way of reward or so that they might discharge their military duties 
more fully. Sometimes, they bought more land or sold what they had been given 
for profit.73 It is likely that the ranks of the servientes were swollen by warriors 
and others, who simply took on the title, without a royal charter formally 
admitting them to the status of a royal serviens. This certainly happened in the 
decades that followed. Where, however, written evidence remains of individual 
69 János Karácsonyi, Samu Borovszky, eds, Regestrum Varadinense examinum ferri candentis 
(Budapest, 1903, hereafter Regestrum Varadinense), 172, 181, 194, 197, 235, 270–273, 283, 297; 
CDES, 183. 
70 Regestrum Varadinense, 237, 269, 271, 273, 283, 296. 
71 The point is well made by László Veszprémy, “Servientes, sergaints. Katonai reformok a 12–13. 
századi Magyarországon és Európában”, in Gyöngyi Erdei and Balázs Nagy, eds, Változatok a 
történelemre. Tanulmányok Székely György tiszteletére (Budapest, 2004), 151–155 (154). 
72 AUO, VI, 355 (1212). For the first grant of the title with a conveyance of land, see RA, I, 336 
(1217). 
73 RA, I, no 244; CDES, 181, 247, 253, 283. 
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preferment, it displays the same language of fidelity and reward as had been 
employed in previous grants of royal land. The serviens was given land, or 
confirmed in his possession of it, in token of his faithfulness and in the expec-
tation that it would inspire him to further acts of valorous endeavour. He was 
bestowed with the permanent and ‘golden liberty’ of royal service, by virtue 
of which he was taken into the king’s familia and into his hall, ‘and he and his 
descendants will ever more be deemed to be of our home and household.’74 
Few of the servientes could in reality have taken advantage of this opportunity, 
for their lands were scattered across the kingdom. Their membership of the 
royal household and family was in this sense fictive, conveyed in the language of 
personal kingship. Nonetheless, in time of war, the serviens was expected to join 
the royal host, fighting under the king’s command and in his personal retinue. 
In respect of their proximity to the ruler, the personal service they 
discharged and remuneration they were owed, the status enjoyed by the servi-
entes was at least rhetorically close to the position held by the established lordly 
elite of noblemen. From the 1240s, therefore, they increasingly assumed the 
title of noble, even though seldom possessed of the same land, resources and 
political influence.75 By the 1260s, the identification of nobiles with servientes 
was complete. The royal charter of 1267 thus refers to the petition ‘of all the 
nobles of the kingdom of Hungary, who are called royal servientes.’76 Thereafter, 
the term of servientes gradually fell into abeyance, to be superseded entirely 
by the name of nobiles. To compensate for this dilution in the meaning of 
nobility, the lordly elite increasingly adopted the additional titles of barones and 
magnates, thus differentiating themselves from the mass of middling and poor 
noblemen.77 Nevertheless, because both lords and common noblemen shared 
the same, unmediated relationship to the ruler, it was later possible to posit that 
they were legally possessed of the same status, enjoying una eademque libertas.78
Quite how the servientes were drawn into the conflict between Andrew II 
and the ‘Imre party’ must remain uncertain. Notwithstanding later references 
in charters of preferment to the servientes as a collegium and coetus, they were 
surely as a group too politically immature and geographically dispersed to have 
acted in concert. The suspicion must therefore arise that they were manipulated 
74 Váczy, A királyi serviensek, 263. See also, Péter Váczy, A szimbolikus államszemlélet kora 
Magyarországon (Máriabesnyő, Gödöllő, 2004), 11–18, 30–31 (first published in 1932). 
75 The precise point at which nobilis and serviens became identical is contested. Some of the 
literature is reviewed in János Varga, A keltjobbágyfiúk legendája. Forrástanulmány az Árpád-kori 
társadalom történetéhez (Budapest, 2009), 23–25. The process of assimilation is described by 
Ilona Bolla, A jogilag egységes jobbágyosztály kialakulása Magyarországon (Budapest, 1983), 67. 
76 DRMH, I2, 40. 
77 Mályusz, “A magyar köznemesség kialakulása”, 277.
78 Martyn Rady, “Stephen Werbőczy and his Tripartitum”, in DRMH, vol. V, xxvii–xliv (xxxviii).
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to intervene, either by the ruler or by the ‘Imre faction’ or by the young King 
Béla. It is in this last respect suggestive that during the 1220s Béla also ceded 
a succession of charters, raising the recipients to the rank of servientes.79 The 
petition of the servientes, which lies at the heart of the Golden Bull, never-
theless discloses the way that they sought to expound their relationship to the 
king. First, at the king’s annual assembly, ‘all the servientes who wish shall freely 
gather there.’ Since this assembly also functioned as a court of law, the servientes 
were here asserting the right of being judicially subject only to the king or his 
deputy, the palatine, and no longer, as the Golden Bull expressly laid down, to 
the authority of the lords of the castles. Secondly, despite the mayhem caused 
by Andrew II’s ‘new arrangements’, there was no attempt to rein in the pace 
of alienation, save the article forbidding the grant of whole counties.80 Plainly, 
the servientes did not wish to impede the flow of royal munificence, in which 
they might expect to have a share. Thirdly, the servientes were anxious lest their 
fidelity to the ruler be interpreted in such a way as to drain their resources, 
seeking in particular not to be drawn into fighting abroad. In respect, however, 
of campaigns within the kingdom, ‘all are obliged to go, without exception.’ 
Most of all, however, the servientes sought to free themselves of the burdens that 
had previously attached to their status as castle warriors – their jurisdictional 
subordination to the lords of the counties, their obligation to provide hospi-
tality or grazing land, the precarious hereditability of their property – and to 
affirm the immediacy of their relationship to the king. 
Later History
In the century following its issue, all mention of the Golden Bull disap-
peared. Although Andrew II continued to promote the interests of the servi-
entes, the provisions of the Golden Bull were too constraining and their political 
implications too radical. As in the case of King John and Innocent III, Andrew 
had the support of Pope Honorius III, who considered the Golden Bull to have 
been forcibly extracted from the ruler as well to contain clauses damaging to the 
church. It is possibly for this reason that it was never registered in the papal curia.81 
79 RA, I, nos 569, 570, 574, 575. 
80 The county of Esztergom had been alienated in 1215 to the archbishop. The charter recording 
this (RA, no 300) is now thought to be genuine. See Kristó, “II. András király “új intézkedései”, 
274. The dwarf county of Locsmánd (Lutzmannsburg) was also alienated by Andrew II around 
this time. See Gyula Kristó, A vármegyék kialakulása Magyarországon (Budapest, 1988), 278–279. 
81 Géza Érszegi, “A History of the Genesis of the Golden Bull”, in De Bulla Aurea, 191–201 
(194). This presupposes, however, a degree of organization in the papal chancery that cannot 
yet be demonstrated. See Jane E. Sayers, Papal Government and England during the Pontificate of 
Honorius III (1216–1227) (Cambridge, 1984), 58–66. 
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Nevertheless, recollection of the Golden Bull could not be effaced. The charter 
of 1267, published jointly by Béla IV and his son, followed the arrangement 
of the Golden Bull, repeating its concessions, often verbatim. Importantly, the 
charter of 1267 built on the Golden Bull by declaring the principle that the 
annual assembly be attended by representatives of the counties, and this clause 
was subsequently expanded in 1290 to permit their scrutiny of royal appoint-
ments. The charter of 1298, which is mostly concerned with the restoration of 
order, was even issued in the assembly’s name, as the product of the nobility’s 
consultations, although with the consent of the king and his barons. In short, 
the development of representative institutions in Hungary shows a line that can 
be tracked back through 1267, the supposed ‘birthdate of the Hungarian corpo-
rative diet’, to 1222 and the Golden Bull.82 Perhaps indeed, as Henrik Marczali 
slyly observed, the whole history of Hungary’s constitution was, like Bishop 
Stubbs’s observation on Magna Carta, a commentary on the Golden Bull.83 
Hungary’s fourteenth-century Angevin rulers were averse to sharing power 
with representative bodies, and the further development of parliamentary 
practice would have to wait in Hungary until the fifteenth century. It was under 
these circumstances of adversity that the Golden Bull was expressly recalled, 
yielding the 1318 copy. In that year, four prelates sealed a copy of the charter 
of 1222, presenting it to the Angevin ruler, Charles Robert, in the hope that he 
would acknowledge the royal obligation to convene an assembly (or recognize 
the decisions of one that had been called in his absence).84 Their selection of the 
Golden Bull for this purpose may have been on account of the resistance clause 
included within it, which they deemed an inducement to royal compliance.85 
As it turned out, Charles Robert did not confirm the copy of the Golden Bull 
that had been presented to him. Nevertheless, in 1351 his son and successor, 
Louis the Great, republished and confirmed its text, considering it a convenient 
summary of the nobility’s privileged status. He did, however, alter the terms of 
its clause relating to the free inheritance of noble property.86 
From this point onwards, the Golden Bull was regarded as emblematic of 
noble liberty. In 1384 and again in 1397, the Golden Bull was republished – on 
the first occasion through the reissue of Louis’s charter of 1351; and on the 
second in a revised form that sought to update its contents. In 1440, the Golden 
82 The quotation is from György Bónis, “The Freedom of the Land in Medieval Hungarian Law”, 
Anciens Pays et assemblées d’états 53 (1970): 94–116 (107). 
83 Marczali, Magyarország története az Árpádok korában, 79. 
84 Érszegi, “Az aranybulla,”5. 
85 Alajos Degré, “Az ellenállási jog története Magyarországon”, Jogtudományi Közlöny 35 (1980), 
366–371 (367–368). 
86 DRMH, II, 8–9.
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Bull was included in a libellus, which otherwise contained the texts of the laws 
of 1298 and 1351 as well as a short compendium of customary regulations.87 
These were confirmed by Wladislas I several days after his coronation. Matthias 
Corvinus, on the occasion of the coronation diet held in 1464, also expressly 
agreed to uphold the terms of the Golden Bull.88 Matthias’s successor, Wladislas 
II, similarly committed himself after being crowned in 1490 to maintain the 
terms of the Golden Bull. On the occasion of his wife’s coronation in 1521, 
Louis II, who had been crowned as an infant in his father’s own lifetime, likewise 
promised to uphold the Golden Bull’s contents.89 From the sixteenth century 
onwards, the text of the Golden Bull was included in successive editions of the 
kingdom’s laws, as the only surviving piece of thirteenth-century legislation.90 
The Golden Bull was additionally used by the lawyer and politician, 
Stephen Werbőczy, to lend the semblance of antiquity to what he claimed were 
the inviolable privileges of the Hungarian nobility. In the influential law code 
known as the Tripartitum, which he published in 1517, Werbőczy described 
the Golden Bull and the rights it conveyed as ones that ‘the Hungarian people 
to the present day exalt to the stars as if they were holy decrees.’ Quite errone-
ously, Werbőczy also claimed that Hungary’s kings swore to observe the Golden 
Bull during their coronations, before the Holy Crown was put on their heads.91 
This was never the case, although later commentators, relying on Werbőczy, 
often presumed otherwise.92 Werbőczy also drew attention to the resistance 
clause in the Golden Bull, declaring that it gave the Hungarian nobility ‘ever 
more the liberty to resist and oppose the king without taint of infidelity.’ In 
fact, the resistance clause had never been previously invoked to justify insur-
rection, notwithstanding the inventiveness by which some Hungarian rebels 
sought to justify their actions. As a consequence of its inclusion within the 
Tripartitum, however, the so-called ius resistendi became part of the rhetoric 
of rebellion, being variously deployed in the seventeenth century, and indeed 
later, to justify uprisings against Habsburg rule.93 In 1687, Leopold I obliged a 
87 Ibid., 14–15, 21–23, 90. 
88 Érszegi, “Az aranybulla”, 9. 
89 Bartoniek, “A koronázási eskü”, 41–3.
90 Mihály Párniczky, János Bátyka, A magyar Corpus Juris (Az első kiadások forrásai) (Budapest, 
1936), 43–74.
91 Tripartitum, I.9 [6] (DRMH, V, 57).
92 Kees Teszelszky, Az ismeretlen korona. Jelentések, szimbólumok es nemzeti identitás (Budapest, 
2009), 250
93 Péter, “Ius resistendi in Hungary”, 46–53; Martyn Rady, “Bocskai, Rebellion and Resistance in 
Early Modern Hungary”, in Péter and Rady, Resistance, Rebellion and Revolution, 57–66 (65–66); 
Elemér Balogh, “The Place of the Golden Bull in Hungarian Constitutional History”, in De Bulla 
Aurea, 203–224 (223–234). 
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cowed Hungarian diet to declare the resistance clause invalid.94 Paradoxically, 
the Golden Bull was always thereafter referred to in the coronation oath, in 
respect of the neo-rex’s statement that, while respecting the historic laws and 
rights of the kingdom, he was no longer bound by the resistance clause included 
in the Golden Bull. Presumably, therefore, the rest of the Golden Bull was still 
binding, even though its contents were by this time thoroughly anachronistic. 
Reference to the Golden Bull was retained in the royal oath right through to the 
coronation in 1916 of Hungary’s last king.95 
Conclusion
The Golden Bull thus managed the same trajectory as the Magna Carta, 
moving over time from a piece of legislation to the status of symbolic artefact.96 
It originated, however, in a petition submitted to the king by the royal servientes, 
a group that had only recently been called into existence by Andrew II’s policies. 
The petition was presented on the occasion of a crisis in royal government 
that had been provoked by supporters of the previous king. The content of the 
petition sought to put an end to some of the abuses that afflicted the servientes 
and to enlarge the rights that attached to them by virtue of their new status. 
To these clauses were added several more that promoted the interests of the 
kingdom’s great men, particularly those who had formerly been in the circle 
of King Imre. The Golden Bull thus regulated relationships in much the same 
manner as other charters of liberty granted elsewhere in Europe at this time. The 
intellectual underpinning of the Golden Bull was, however, quite different. The 
interest of the servientes was to preserve the land and resources in which they 
had been confirmed and to maintain their right of proximity to the ruler, in the 
expectation that their faithfulness be met with a fresh flow of royal munificence. 
The resistance clause tacked onto the end of the charter aimed at the same, 
to ensure that noble opposition to the ruler did not have as its consequence a 
distancing from the royal person and from his largesse. 
The Golden Bull conveys freedoms, rights and rules, and may thus be 
considered a charter of liberty, analogous to Magna Carta and any of the other 
great privileges of the thirteenth century. Its contribution to the development of 
representative government also bears in several respects a resemblance to Magna 
Carta’s; likewise, its posthumous reputation. The purpose of the Golden Bull 
was, however, less to constrain the ruler as to express in written form the rights 
94 The text is most conveniently available in C. A. Macartney, The Habsburg and Hohenzollern 
Dynasties in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (London, New York, 1970), 85–86.
95 The text of the coronation oath is recorded in Law 3 of 1917. The Golden Bull did not, 
however, feature in the oaths of the Regent and National Leader. 
96 Nicholas Vincent, Magna Carta: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, 2012), 102. 
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that belonged to the servientes and which were the mark of their status. It is the 
petition of the servientes that the Golden Bull conveys and it is their concerns 
that it primarily reflects. Preeminent among these was the continued connection 
between fidelity, service and reward, and the immediacy of the bond that united 
the servientes to the ruler. With the subsequent transformation of the servientes 
into the kingdom’s common nobility, proximity to the monarch continued to be 
understood as one of the distinguishing marks of noble status. Its manifestation 
was the land that the nobleman held of the ruler, which celebrated the fidelity 
that his forbears had shown and which continued to bind its possessor in a 
bond of affection to the monarch. The interconnectedness of ruler and nobility 
achieved its later formulation in Werbőczy’s account: all nobility derives from 
the king, ‘and these two by virtue of some reciprocal transfer and mutual bond 
between them, depend upon each other so closely that neither can be separated 
and removed from the other and neither can exist without the other.’97 It is this 
principle that the Golden Bull expounds. 
UNGARIA ŞI BULA DE AUR DIN 1222
Rezumat 
Bula de Aur ungară din 1222 este un document compozit, realizat într-un moment 
de criză în guvernarea regatului. Esenţa ei rezidă într-o petiţie. Aceasta a fost transformată 
într-un privilegiu de către cancelaria regală care i-a adăugat elemente noi, incluzând 
aşa-numita clauză de opoziţie. Petiţia şi revizuirea cancelariei se raportează la două grupuri 
electorale diferite, anume servientes regis şi, respectiv, o parte dintre nobilii regatului sau 
mari seniori care îşi însuşiseră de curând puterea. În secolele următoare promulgării sale, 
Bula de Aur a fost uitată, dar a devenit ulterior simbol al libertăţii aristocrate. Clauza sa de 
opoziţie a căpătat o semnificaţie aparte printr-o relectură din secolul al XVI-lea, în baza 
căreia referinţa la Bula de Aur a fost, mai târziu, inclusă în jurământul de încoronare ungar.
97 Tripartitum, I. 4 [7] (DRMH, V, 51). 
